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Key Messages
• User-generated content (UGC) is ethically and 
legally owned by the creator of the content. 
This ownership rule applies whether users 
promote a product or service online, express 
their views, or they publish news, analysis, or 
opinion pieces in text or multimedia format.
• UGC platforms are provided by electronic 
systems organizers (ESOs) that publish content 
created and uploaded directly by the users, not 
by the providers. UGC comprises a vast amount 
of extremely diversified information, including 
images, videos, comments, and product 
advertisements published on dedicated 
websites or exchanged on messaging 
applications.
• MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 prohibits certain 
types of content, but does not provide clear 
definitions, especially what is considered to 
“agitate society and disturb public order”. 
Without a precise definition of prohibited 
content, the task of filtering and moderating 
the content on ESO platforms in line with 
government regulations is becoming more 
complex. This carries the risk that ESOs 
will follow the precautionary principle and 
excessively block lawful content due to 
remaining doubts about its legality.
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Various internet intermediaries in Indonesia allow more than 175.4 million users to express their ideas and 
engage in economic activities (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2020). Online intermediaries consist of internet service 
providers (ISPs), internet hosting services, social media platforms, and e-commerce platforms (Chander, 2016). In 
Indonesia, online intermediaries are legally categorized as Electronic Systems Organizers (ESOs) defined as any 
person, state actor, business entity, and community that provides, manages, and/or operates electronic systems 
individually or collectively for their users. They serve their own needs or those of other parties. Intermediaries 
are hosting, locating, and searching for user-generated content (UGC) and facilitate its distribution. This policy 
brief addresses the rules applicable to private ESOs. 
UGC consists of images, videos, comments, product advertisements, content on messaging applications and other 
content that is being constantly produced by users, such as subscribers to social media platforms, or merchants 
on e-commerce platforms. The increasing spread of UGC has contributed to the landscape of the digital economy 
in Indonesia.
The vast number of people using UGC platforms illustrates the importance of UGC in Indonesia. The Digital 2020 
Report states that there were approximately 160 million social media users in Indonesia and 95% were found to 
be actively engaged with or contributed to social media (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2020). Indonesia has 57 million 
Instagram users and it has been estimated that they produce the most Instagram stories in the world (McKinsey, 
2018). Meanwhile, Jakarta has previously been ranked as the city with the most active Twitter accounts in the 
world (McKinsey, 2018). Subscribers in Jakarta produced 2.4% of the 10.6 billion tweets posted between January 
and March 2014 (Carley, Malik, Kowalchuck, Pfeffer & Landwehr, 2015), which amounted to 116,000 tweets per 
hour. 
• MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 exempts online 
intermediaries that provide UGC from 
being liable for hosting prohibited content 
if they maintain an electronic information 
management system and reporting platform 
and satisfy content moderation requirements 
outlined in the regulation. 
• Once notified of prohibited content found on 
their platform, ESOs need to take it down 
within 24 hours, or within 4 hours if the take 
down is considered urgent, such as for child 
pornography, terrorism, or content deemed 
capable of causing social unrest. With an 
unclear definition of content that agitates 
society and disturbs public order, this may 
not be sufficient time to check and respond to 
requests for removal.
• The legal exemption of ESOs for UGC remains 
vague saying UGC-based online intermediaries 
“can be exempted” from liability after they 
fulfil all content moderation requirements. This 
implies that online intermediaries can still be 
held liable even after they have fulfilled all 
requirements. Article 11 should be revised and 
clearly state that online intermediaries “shall 
be exempted” from liability instead of “can be 
exempted.”
• The government should consider to co-
regulate UGC together with the private sector. A 
meaningful Public-Private Dialogue and shared 
responsibilities help the regulatory process 
to keep up with the fast-changing digital 
landscape and to stay open for innovation and 
technological progress. to keep up with the fast-
changing digital landscape and to stay open for 
innovation and technological progress. 
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UGC platforms for e-commerce add to the complexity. 4.5 million active merchants in Indonesia create their 
own content on online trading platforms. According to media reports, those platforms facilitated 140 million 
e-commerce transactions in the month of August 2020, equal to 188,000 transactions per hour (Tempo, 2020). 
The sheer volume of user-generated content on social media and in e-commerce illustrates its benefits for 
civic education, and also for the economy, for example through the empowerment of women entrepreneurs and 
increased financial inclusion. Controlling UGC is, therefore, not just a monumental task, but it also must abstain 
from overly reducing the benefits of UGC.
Internet platforms have been used to publish content that had been prohibited by the government of Indonesia. 
This includes pornography, online gambling, the sale of prohibited drugs and protected flora and fauna. As of 
2019, the Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Informatics (MOCI) received more than 430,000 reports of 
prohibited content provided on platforms of online intermediaries (MOCI, 2020). 
A regulatory framework determines liabilities to prevent the spread for prohibited content. In 2017, for example, 
MOCI held Facebook responsible for hosting online activities of Saracen, a group that was found guilty of 
disseminating hate speech on social media (Islami, 2017). In Indonesia’s relatively young democracy, hate speech 
and hoaxes are considered harmful and have been included in the category of prohibited content. MOCI announced 
they will fine social media platforms that facilitate the distribution of hoaxes (MOCI, 2018). 
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Regulations Concerning User-Generated Content
MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 regarding Private Electronic System Organizers (private ESOs) defines private ESOs 
as electronic systems run by individuals, business entities, and communities. In this regulation, MOCI mandates 
private ESOs to ensure their platforms do not contain or facilitate the transmission of prohibited content. Prohibited 
content is defined as violating Indonesian laws and regulations or anything that agitates society or disturbs 
public order. This definition is in line with Government Regulation No. 71/2019 regarding the Implementation of 
Electronic Systems and Transactions, which is the legal basis of MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020.
The definition of prohibited content has undergone changes in previous regulations. MOCI Regulation No. 19/2014 
regarding the Handling of Negative Content in Internet Websites rather broadly considered content as prohibited 
when it was negative, such as pornographic material, content considered illegal by laws and regulations, or 
other content reported by ministries or agencies. Two years later, MOCI Circular Letter 5/2016 concerning 
Limitations and Responsibilities of UGC-Based E-Commerce divided prohibited content into negative content 
and impermissible content. It only regulated e-commerce platforms and excluded social media channels. 
Negative content consisted of pornography, gambling, provocative and frightening content, materials that violate 
intellectual property rights, hacking and access to narcotics services, misleading information (fraud and money 
laundering scheme), human and organ trafficking, and material related to cigarettes (Molina, 2017). Meanwhile, 
impermissible content referred to services and products that must not receive a permit to be sold online, such as 
weapons, prohibited drugs and foods, and protected flora and fauna. This definition was more detailed compared 
to the previous regulation.
MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 revoked MOCI Regulation No. 19/2014. Consequently, the term “negative content” is 
no longer used but, despite efforts to clarify the definition of prohibited content, ambiguities remain. In a country 
where a rather conservative citizenship coexists with some progressive urban centres there is no consensus 
on what constitutes pornography. It also remains unclear what agitates society and disturbs public order. Given 
these ambiguities, some ministries, agencies, and law enforcement authorities provide their own definitions 
to control the content on internet platforms. This causes differing and confusing interpretations. The absence 
of a clear definition of prohibited content results in the increased complexity of content moderation by private 
ESOs. This carries the risk that online intermediaries will block even permissible UGC due to doubts regarding 
its legality (De Streel et. al., 2020). 
Excessive controls or preventive self-censorship can threaten the freedom of expression in Indonesia. According 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was ratified by the Indonesian government on 
28 October 2005, governments can limit the freedom of expression for the purpose of national security and 
for the protection of human dignity from racism, hoaxes, hate speech, and defamation (ICCPR 1966, 1976). 
These limitations need to be exercised through laws and regulations. Nonetheless, with an unclear definition of 
prohibited content, current limitations could worsen the freedom of expression in Indonesia. A 2020 survey by 
Indonesian National Human Rights Commission on the state of the freedom of speech, expression, and assembly 
in Indonesia found that 29% of the respondents were afraid to criticize the government and 36.2% were afraid to 
express their opinions on the internet (Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, 2020). The Human Rights 
Commission considers this an alarming signal for Indonesia to protect its democracy and freedom of expression 
(Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, 2020).
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MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 implicitly acknowledges the principle that UGC is ethically and legally being owned 
by the creator of the content. Ownership remains with the individual creator, whether the content promotes a 
product or service, or whether it contains news, general information, analysis, or opinions. With this, Indonesia 
follows international standards. Intermediaries in the United States can freely expand and innovate without 
fear of lawsuits. Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1966, they enjoy immunity from 
legal actions resulting from unlawful user content. With this regulation, the U.S. government intends fostering 
innovative solutions for online intermediaries and allowing them to establish their own community standards for 
UGC (Chander, 2016; Kosseff, 2017).
However, MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 only exempts online intermediaries in Indonesia from liabilities for UGC, 
if they ensure their platforms do not contain and facilitate prohibited content. Moreover, the regulation merely 
stipulates that online intermediaries “can be exempted” from liability if they fulfil all content moderation 
requirements (Article 11) mentioned further below. The ambiguity of the wording in article 11 suggests that the 
exemption is just an option and that online intermediaries can still be held liable even if they have fulfilled the 
requirements. This, again, leads to uncertainties for private ESOs and undermines international “safe harbor” 
standards not to hold intermediaries liable.
Online intermediaries need to establish complaint reporting tools and an electronic information/document 
governance system to take down prohibited content.  MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 gives online intermediaries 24 
hours to remove prohibited content after it has been found and the company was notified. The deadline has been 
shortened to four hours in case content is considered urgent because it contains material related to terrorism, 
child pornography, and content causing social unrest. Given the volume of UGC generated at any time, this is 
a relatively short period to check the reported content, verify that it falls under prohibited content, decide on 
corporate action, and finally block or remove the content. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) also 
mandates to remove content containing threats of violence and slander within 24 hours, but it only applies this to 
online platforms with more than two million users. It also allows for a seven day period for legally more complex 
cases (APC, 2018).
In Indonesia, the timeframe applies to all types of online intermediaries regardless of the company size. While 
it is a challenge for large online intermediaries to act so quickly, it becomes a disproportionately larger burden 
for smaller intermediaries with less resources to provide the necessary corporate infrastructure. If large online 
intermediaries are foreign-owned, while smaller ones are Indonesian, the short timeframe may also discriminate 
against domestic enterprises.   
Failure to meet content moderation obligations and take down requirements will result in the imposition of 
sanctions. This has been established by Government Regulation No. 71/2019 and was also reinstated by MOCI 
Regulation No. 5/2020 holding ESOs liable for hosting prohibited content. Fines for violations can amount to IDR 
100 - 500 million (MOCI, 2019). MOCI can block the internet access of online intermediaries if they do not take 
down content or fail to pay the fines. MOCI will notify online intermediaries to remove the content prior to blocking 
access. Should the access be blocked, online intermediaries can unlock access by fulfilling the responsibilities 
they previously failed to fulfil. Again, this puts smaller intermediaries at a disadvantage due to their limited 
resources.
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Co-regulation as a Meaningful Step Forward
Co-regulation should be considered in the regulatory process as it provides an option to improve the effectiveness 
of preventing prohibited UGC. Co-regulation is a regulatory approach that emphasizes public-private dialogue as 
well as responsibility-sharing between the government and a broad spectrum of non-state actors. It focuses on 
collaboration in the creation, adoption, enforcement, and evolution of policies and regulations (Aprilianti & Dina, 
2021). This collaboration facilitates regulatory enforcement and it also takes the interests of the private sector 
into account, thereby giving the needed space and incentive for innovation and growth. 
In a co-regulatory environment, the government sets out general codes, for instance setting the heaviest content 
removal requirements for planned terrorist attacks or child abuse. At the same time, private ESOs will formulate a 
code of conduct or code of practice that determines detailed arrangements on what type of content or behaviours 
are acceptable on their platforms. These shared responsibilities make the regulations more flexible in responding 
to the changing digital landscape with ever new business models and services available. Co-regulation allows a 
substantial increase of compliance levels as the private sector works alongside the government with the shared 
goal of improving industry-wide performance (APC, 2019).
Similar to Indonesia, the United Kingdom currently protects online intermediaries from legal liabilities for hosting 
harmful content until they have received notification of its existence on their platforms. The Online Harms White 
Paper of the UK government now considers introducing co-regulation for harmful UGC. The UK government plans 
to work with industry players and the civil society to tackle harmful content, such as developing technologies 
for a safer online environment. The resulting regulations are meant to follow a risk-based approach to introduce 
proportionate measures (UK Government, 2019). Rather than requiring the removal of specific content, regulations 
will focus on prioritising actions to tackle harmful content when it is perceived as an extraordinary threat or 
causing the greatest harm. Evidence gathered on all sides will be used to formulate practicable recommendations 
considering the nature of the harm, the risk of the harm, and the technology available to the companies to counter 
harmful content (UK Government, 2019).
The immediate first step of co-regulation is the involvement of a broad range of private stakeholders in the policy 
formulation through Public-Private Dialogue (PPD). PPD improves the transparency, quality, and effectiveness of 
the regulation as the relevant actors are directly involved in policy formulation (OECD, 2007). PPD allows MOCI 
to explore best practices and to ensure that regulations lead to sustainable and effective content moderation, 
while also allowing for the freedom of expression, an open civil dialogue and prospering e-commerce. MOCI has 
already engaged private ESOs in the policymaking process and found it beneficial, for instance when reviewing 
the Personal Data Protection Bill. The Ministry has also been open to public consultations regarding regulations 
on UGC (Park, 2020).
Co-regulation is needed to evaluate MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020. Given the regulation has now been implemented, 
future co-regulation efforts will allow for the assessment of the strengths and the weakness of the regulation. In a 
co-regulatory process, MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 can be evaluated against reliable evidence from the industry. 
This allows for the adjustment of the regulation to the real circumstances faced by the industry and to their actual 
capacities to tackle prohibited and harmful content.
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